At the beginning of the transformation process in Poland in 1990, local and regional governance structures were practically non-existent. The 'voivodship' was the regional administrative centre, which simply acted as a conduit for the policies of various government departments in Warsaw. The article reviews dominant perspectives on the transformation of regions in post-communist economies.While the evolutionary approach is a good critique of neoliberal approaches, it is argued that it assumes a consensus and congruity of local interests and underplays the role of exogenous influences in shaping emerging governance structures at both the local and national level. The framework adopted in the article is institutionalist, drawing on the importance of informal institutions in shaping local and national economies. Further, power and differentiated interests are seen as central to understanding emerging structures. Finally, the role of exogenous influences such as aid and investment are highlighted in understanding how the regions of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are fitting into the emerging international division of labour. The empirical focus of the article is the Wrocław local economy, with particular reference to changes in the municipality. Transformation is explored in relation to three agents of change. First, the 'nomenklatura' who have converted their social capital of the past into economic capital during the process of transformation. Second, the role of workers is seen as important in either contesting or cooperating with the restructuring process. Finally, the role of imported intellectual capital through foreign investment, consultants and aid is viewed as central to instituting a new set of informal institutions compatible with the market.
KEY WORDS ★ institutionalist approach ★ intellectual capital ★ Polish regions ★ transformation ★ Wrocław and Stark, 1997) which emphasizes the notion of path contingency. The point of departure is to draw on the old institutionalists (Veblen, 1899; Myrdal, 1957) in general, and the American school in particular (Dugger, 1989; Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Samuels, 1995) , who see power and differentiated interests as central to an analysis of economic change.
The third part of the article begins with a discussion of reconstructing local governance in Wrocław, with particular reference to the municipality. This includes an audit of the formal institutions of the locality in terms of political organizations and representation, development agencies and business organizations. Beyond formal organizations, importance is also given to the informal behaviours and continuities with the past that underpin these emerging structures and the networks that characterize them.
In line with an emphasis on both agency and the existence of differentiated interests, the third part of the article focuses on path shapers, that is those agents of change who are forging the new institutional landscape. Institutionalists, rather than seeing a harmony of interests, see economic processes as inherently conflictual; the partial disappearance of centralized planning has allowed divergent interests to emerge. Continuation is represented by those groups who occupied positions of power under the old regime, while newly formed groups previously deprived of participation in the different institutional games are endeavouring to gain recognition for their aspirations (Bafoil, 1999) . In particular, the 'nomenklatura', trade unions and institutions from the US and western Europe are identified and their role as the major path shapers in the Wrocław local economy elaborated.
The empirical material draws on fieldwork that took place in Wrocław between 1996 and 2001, where extensive interviews were conducted with local actors, firms, development agencies and trade unions.
The Wrocław economy
The focus of the empirical work is Wrocław, which is located in Lower Silesia in the south west of Poland, and was one of 49 'voivodships' (approximately equivalent to English counties) up until the administrative reorganization of 1999. The Wrocław 'voivodship' encompasses diverse subregions ranging from rural areas to small towns dependent on one firm; however, this article focuses on the main city in the region. In the context of marked regional disparities and uneven transformation (Gorzelak, 2000; OECD, 2000) the Wrocław municipality is regarded as relatively successful, along with other areas of Poland such as Gdańsk, Poznań and Krakow.
These regions have already demonstrated the highest potential for restructuring and relatively quick adaptation to the new conditions (Gorzelak, 1996; . It has been suggested that these regions are the leaders of Polish transformation with relatively low unemployment, a well-educated labour force and developed infrastructure, and a concentration of Polish scientific and academic potential. In these regions privatization processes are the most progressed, the inflow of foreign capital greatest and the growth of the service sector fastest. Gorzelak (1996) points to a central European boomerang delimited by the following areas: Gdańsk-Poznań-Wrocław-Prague-BrnoBratislava/Vienna-Budapest, with the eastern wall becoming the dead-end of Central Europe. However, the context of Polish regional transformation is much more complex than a simple East-West divide. As Blazyca et al. (2002) point out, this is further complicated by divergences between urban and rural areas, even within the successful regions. Further, the industrial legacies of different regions and cities have important implications for their developmental potential.
Unlike the monoculture which dominated many Polish cities and towns, Wrocław had a diverse economic structure. Under Stalinist economic planning in the 1950s and 1960s the economy had moved into the production of white goods, food processing and light engineering. Among the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which dominated the economic and physical landscape in 1990 were a number of firms regarded as national icons such as Pafawag (trains), Jelcz (trucks and buses) and Polar (white goods), whose privatization was important politically and economically for the locality. The presence of an increasing number of flagship foreign investors such as Volvo, ABB and Cadbury, in addition to bringing direct economic benefits, have had an important demonstration effect for other foreign investors.
An institutionalist perspective
In the neoliberal analysis, which dominated early debates about transformation, economic laws were seen as universal, self-evident and well-understood, as were the ingredients of a successful economy, namely that it should be based on the free market, private property, and the unassailable relationship between competition and efficiency (Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Brada, 1993) . 2 This view suggested that market institutions, where appropriate, could be transferred unproblematically from one domain to another, and that the dead hand of intervention should be avoided, implying a minimal role for both the national and local state. The focus of the neoliberal view was on transformation at a national level, and the primacy accorded to macro-economic stability in this perspective meant that little or no attention was given to the increasing manifestations of regional inequalities. Neoliberal approaches, devoid of history, institutions and place saw the problem of regional disparities only in terms of market failure and capable of being rectified by 'getting the price' right. Their logic suggested that fully functioning markets would allow wages to fall in peripheral areas, attracting mobile foreign investment which would augment comparative advantage and lead to factor equalization.
As the process of transformation between and within countries unfolded much more unevenly and in ways that were unexpected and unintended (Ksiezopolski, 1991; Gora et al., 1993) , the door was left open for non-teleological accounts of social change based on evolutionary analysis (Stark, 1990; Pickel, 1992; Murrell, 1993) . 3 Evolutionary accounts have been associated with schools of thought that see a resurgence of regional economies, local networks and endogenous development processes owing their renewed importance to innovation, local linkages, local interfirm relationships and local exchanges of information. Therefore the evolutionary school argued that institutions should be allowed to emerge in a path-dependent way and that this process would be slow and incremental. By drawing on the notion of path dependency this view suggests that local specificities should be built on to ensure embedded and adaptive economies (Van Zon, 1992; Grabher and Stark, 1997; Hausner et al., 1997) .
The main strength of the evolutionary perspective's analysis of post-communist economic transformation is that it is able to map the way in which social change is incremental and divergent because of deeply structured inherited economic and social relations. Therefore the notion of path dependency is important to understanding the restructuring of localities and the role of existing legacies. It enables an understanding of the way in which the transformation of property relations is a complex process characterized by the recombination of the newly emerging private sector, incoming FDI and the privatization and restructuring of SOEs to produce hybrid organizations (Stark, 1990; . These emerging structures were therefore imbued with the old habits and routines of soft budget constraints, aversion to change, rent seeking and maintaining old networks of contacts.
Evolutionary accounts, however, have tended to underplay fractured interests, power relations and the role of players external to localities and national economies in shaping the form and capacity of governance. This account draws on three insights from institutionalist thinking. First, informal institutions such as values, habits and routines are viewed as critical in shaping local and national economies. It has been argued in some quarters that the legacies of the previous regime are positive resources for forging new trajectories of development (Grabher and Stark, 1997; Uhlir, 1998) . However, entrenched habits of rent seeking and exculpation may act to undermine attempts at building cohesion in a locality. Therefore informal institutions can facilitate or impede economic growth and integration with the global economy in that habits and norms that persisted from the previous regime, in terms of a climate of kleptocracy by the elite and general distrust, may constrain the repertoire of alternative development paths. The fragmentation and atomization of society may inhibit information flows and hamper open debate (Van Zon, 1998) . Under communism, the habit of passivity meant that regions were incapable of generating self-sustained economic processes due European Urban and Regional Studies 2004 11(4) HARDY: REBUILDING LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES to a lack of critical institutions (Hausner et al., 1997; Kosonen, 1997) .Therefore the notion of informal institutions has aided an understanding of the transformation process in terms of explaining the diversity of outcomes and the problems that arise from imposing a textbook set of solutions at the level of the national economy, locality or individual firm.
A second strand of institutionalist thinking not only acknowledges the importance of informal institutions but goes further in arguing that they need to be understood in terms of their content, their creation and their recreation (Veblen, 1899; Myrdal, 1957) . This approach, therefore, views localities as fractured by differentiated interests rather than as coherent. Old institutionalism 4 draws attention to the way in which power and asymmetrical relations of power are central to understanding economic changes and processes (Klein, 1987; Dugger, 1989; Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Samuels, 1995) . Rather than positing a scenario of freely contracting individuals, this account assumes a world in which institutions give some groups of interests disproportionate access to the decision-making process. Therefore in contrast to consensual accounts a distinctive feature of this approach is a rejection of the harmony of interests: 'We are not all in the same boat, some of us have been thrown overboard so a rising tide affects us differently' (Myrdal, 1957: 111) .
Third, in contrast to evolutionary accounts which focus heavily on the possibilities for and the desirability of endogenous change, this account emphasizes the importance and role of exogenous players in the development and governance of localities. It is important not just to understand how Poland and its regions are fitting into the emerging international division of labour, but also the role played by supranational organizations in framing the emerging material and discursive practices in Poland and other countries in transformation. Baker and Welsh (1999) suggest that these instruments of 'rational' Western modernization operating in CEE include some of the most perfectly honed instruments of global governance that have evolved in the postwar period; most notably these include the World Bank, IMF, G7 and the EU. These organizations have precluded some paths of transformation and narrowly limited choices, in the case of the EU for example, in terms of positing particular models of local governance (Smith and Hardy, 2002) . Significantly these organizations have affected the restructuring processes of firms and in particular the form and content of the privatization process. 5 With the arrival of foreign investment, TNCs and their executives have been to the fore in instilling new material and discursive practices through the deep restructuring of workplaces and workplace behaviour (Swain, 1998) , and the institution-bending effects of foreign investment may have greatly exceeded their immediate economic impacts (Hardy, 1998) .
As important as the new managerialist discourse itself has been the growth of agents responsible for its spread across the globe who form an emergent and increasingly powerful class. This class is now self-organizing and responsible for the production and distribution of managerial knowledge, and includes such means of dissemination as the popularity of studying business, seminars, and texts by management gurus (Thrift, 2001) . The link between corporate strategy and regional restructuring is increasingly being influenced by this growing use of consultancy expertise used by large companies to access technical knowledge (Antonelli, 1999) but especially to bring about the 'management of change'. Consultancies operate through the corporate networks of clients, thus exerting national and global influence on patterns of geographical industrialization (Wood, 2000) . Creating the right attitudes and institutional conditions has been at the heart of assistance and aid from the Western market economies. The aim of these programmes was to 'win hearts and minds' with the overriding aim of disembedding the old ideas and instilling a set of assumptions, norms, habits and rules of behaviour that were compatible with a capitalist economy.
This notion of a group of people who create and promulgate a set of ideas to justify particular actions and conditions is elaborated by Thrift (1998; who points to the advent of 'soft' or 'knowledgeable' capitalism with intellectual capital as being central to the new competition. Intellectual capital can be understood as comprising the tacit and codified knowledge of individual firms (Klein, 1998) , and also the particular understandings of the business community collectively. One important element of intellectual capital is managerialist discourses or enabling myths which legitimate certain kinds of constructs, positions and affective states over others (Thrift, 1998) .
In the next section we turn to look at the development of governance in the Wrocław 'voivodship' in general, and the municipality since 1990.
Reconstructing local governance
This section begins by examining the way that after 1948 a process of Stalinization took place in Poland as a whole, the result of which was that the local economy and society were controlled through a combination of local agents of the centre (the 'voivodship') and SOEs. This is followed by a discussion of how legacies persisting from the pre-1990 period shaped the emergent formal and informal institutions in the Wrocław locality.
Rebuilding social capital
The period after the Second World War saw a dramatic shift in the social structure of Poland, with the decomposition of coherent local communities and historical regions as thousands of people were uprooted (Krzysztofek, 1992) . Wrocław was formerly the German city of Breslau. In the postwar settlement, the border of Poland moved to the west; Breslau (renamed Wrocław) was ceded to Poland, and one of the most dramatic features of postwar Wrocław was the forced migration of the German population between 1945 and 1947 which transformed the ethnic composition of the city (Davies and Moorhouse, 2002) . 6 By 1948 Wrocław was repopulated with people from Lvov (ceded to the Soviet Union) and peasants driven by poverty from villages in central Poland. These two groups were joined by human flotsam and jetsom and the dispossessed, who were drawn by stories of work and food, to what Kennedy (1997) describes as the 'El Dorado' of the West.
From 1948 onwards two elements imposed order on this chaotic situation. First, the Stalinization of society imposed the 'voivodship' as the local agent of national government, as regions were grouted into artificial administrative structures. The 'voivodship' was housed in a purpose-built and imposing building which dominated the city landscape, and which fulfilled the role of a transmission belt for the orders of ministers or party officials. Thus, highranking party officials regarded the personnel of the 'voivodship' as the official guardians of national interests in the region (Jensen and Plum, 1993 ). However, we should be careful not to underplay the complexity of local governance structures under the communist regime, in particular the role of the Communist Party and the networked 'nomenklatura'. For example, some regions were very successful in coordinating national policies for local advantage as a result of particular political and strategic strengths. Between 1945 and 1990, town planning was basically an exercise in accounting and management, serving largely as a diagnostic tool for drawing up an inventory of the region. Although SOEs were largely under the authority of the relevant Ministry in Warsaw, interviews with former managers of these monoliths in Wrocław suggested that there had been regular meetings of an elite coalition in the region comprising leading officials of the 'voivodship' and managers of these companies. However, this had more to do with maintaining social networks and preserving the privileges of social capital than it had with resolving either practical issues or discussion regarding any vision for the local economy outside of fulfilling the plan.
Second, SOEs were a central mechanism through which the communist authorities attempted to impose social control in the region. However, this was far from unproblematic and uncontested as these factories were sites of overt or covert conflict as attempts were made to wrest control from workers in order to stamp Stalinist work practices and ideology onto the workplace (Kennedy, 1997) . Importantly, at a local level, welfare was linked to employment in the large SOEs that dominated the landscape of the Wrocław region. They were significant contributors to welfare capital, and typically provision would include housing, health, vacation homes, nurseries, leisure and sports facilities, although access to these facilities varied between and within firms.
Within firms the 'nomenklatura' acted as 'gatekeepers' (Domanski, 1997) in that they made decisions regarding access to and the allocation and distribution of these benefits. Apart from the direct
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HARDY: REBUILDING LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES benefits they awarded themselves, access to services such as loans, cars, trips abroad was used as patronage for loyal employees. Leisure and social provision was an important source of social cohesion; for example up until the mid-1960s Pafawag (producers of train carriages) had a huge range of activities including choirs, dramatic groups and a wide range of sports teams (Kennedy, 1997) . Aspects of welfare and social activities that persisted into the 1990s included vacation homes, sports facilities, mushroom-picking expeditions and fishing trips, which meant that there was a sense of community and interaction between workers.
By the late 1970s collective activity of a different sort manifested itself in the form of industrial action and political activity spearheaded by Solidarity. Wrocław, along with other major Polish cities, was heavily involved in the fight for political change (Garton Ash, 1999; Davies and Moorhouse, 2002) , with factory occupations in Pafawag and Dolmel in the centre of the city and Polar, Wrozamet and Hydral in the industrial area to the north-east. Tanks were used against workers and activists were arrested and often imprisoned, with fellow workers and neighbours taking collections to support their families. The hegemonic role of SOEs was undermined by the post-martial law reforms of 1981 which decentralized control and devolved functions, giving these firms more autonomy. Although there was a great deal of variation between SOEs with regard to what and how much was divested, social provision, particularly of housing, began to contract.
Renewed crisis in the 1980s brought about a complete breakdown in social cohesion, and the rapid deterioration in the system and its increasing inability to deliver social, economic or political benefits meant that there was a marked deterioration in the quality of life. Although diminished by the end of the 1980s, the welfare capital of SOEs had to a certain extent been preserved. Social capital, however, was in a state of disarray and collapse, and old networks were no longer delivering material or symbolic privileges for the 'nomenklatura'. They were now in the process of searching for new rentseeking opportunities in the purported panacea of the free market and reconstituting old linkages to this end. Those with more foresight had already started to forge new relationships, particularly through foreign-trade opportunities, in anticipation of the collapse of the command economy. These were the legacies that were important for rebuilding local governance from 1990 onwards.
The emerging base of formal institutions
Local economies and regions in Poland in an administrative and political sense were weak and completely undeveloped in comparison with the West. Competencies and the scope of responsibility at a regional level had been constrained by legal acts, the manipulation of elections and limitation of funds. Zaucha (1999) describes the budget of the 'voivodship' as the spatially clustered budgets of individual government ministries. Further, a whole range of intermediate agencies and NGOs -such as chambers of commerce, agencies of regional development, consulting agencies and business support centres -were completely non-existent.
In Poland a self-governmental system on a local level was restored after the first fully democratic elections in 1990. According to a typology of countries (Gorzelak, 1998) , from the point of view of share of local budgets in all public spending and in GDP, Poland was a country of 'shallow decentralisation'. Gminas (communes), the lowest tier of local government, had responsibility for a range of tasks and received money from the state and local taxes to finance their activities. However, Krzysztofek (1992) describes these organizations as lacking the hard instruments for effecting economic development. From 1990 onwards the second territorial unit, the 'voivodship', became increasingly dependent on the central government, or rather several departments of the government in that it had a set of sub-budgets, each of which was under the control of a given Ministry. The voivod (governor of the 'voivodship') was nominated by the prime minister, and there was no elected political representation at the level of 'voivodship'. The process of transferring responsibilities from central government was underway from 1990, but demanded the creation of bigger units, which is reflected in the reform of the territorial structure, which took place from January 1999.
In January 1999 the 49 'voivodships' were replaced by 16 super regions (Kozek, 2000) . This reinstated a middle tier of government in the shape of the district (powiats). Blazyca et al. (2002) suggest that these changes were motivated by two factors. First, the necessity of putting in place structures that were compatible with entry to the European Union. Second, to empower middle-tier districts and 'release independent regional and local energy to promote economic and social development' (Blazyca et al., 2002: 269) .
With regard to regional development, the municipality had published an economic development plan that was accepted in March 1998 entitled Wrocław 2000. Outside of the institutions of local government, the Wrocław Development Agency was formed in December 1999 to promote economic development in the 'voivodship' as a whole. In addition, since 1990 there has been a proliferation of other institutions such as the Lower Silesian and British Chambers of Commerce. 
Old power bases, new power bases
The problem of rebuilding 'localism' had its roots in the legacies of the past. The ability to rebuild a civil society with participation was undermined by the way in which social energy in the previous system had vented itself not into running the system but into rent seeking in the parallel informal economy. Hausner and Marody (2000) point to the importance of social capital based on mutual trust to achieve certain goals, and suggest that the social cement of trust has been undermined by the institutionalization of non-accountability in Poland.
In their view there has been an erosion of state authority as power shifted beyond the bounds of constitutional government, which in the economy related to chaotic decision making with regard to satisfying the demands of powerful and discontented groups. Hausner and Marody (2000) quote a survey by Haman and Wesolowski (1999) which found among 10 features of democracy that 'participation in democracy' was given a relatively low eighth place, while 'choosing the best people to govern' to 'ensure the prosperity of citizenship' was rated top. It was suggested that this reflected a culture of exculpation and passivity regarding participation in democratic and community processes. These issues are now explored in relation to foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Wrocław economy through three themes: the continued importance of SOEs in influencing transformation at a local level; conflict between those converting and reconstituting the social capital of the previous period into new power bases and the emergence of new interests; and how far networks have repressed or stimulated organizational innovation and initiatives. Table 3 gives an indication of the importance of SOEs in the local economy. The legacy of the past in terms of vertical lines of authority between the centre and the regions, overlaid with new piecemeal legislation from 1990 onwards, presented significant problems for formulating any coherent local strategy, particularly at the level of the municipality. The chaotic use of land was a barrier to economic planning in the municipality. A large amount of land was allocated for industrial use, and SOEs continue to be significant landlords owning considerable areas of land in industrial areas to the west and the south east of the City over which the municipality lacked control. This gave managers of SOEs a degree of control in shaping inward investment. For example, by 1998 three foreign supermarkets had been sold land by SOEs without consulting the municipality. Large SOEs dominated the economic landscape at the beginning of the transformation period, several of which continued to be significant employers. The legacy of the past was one where the central relationship was between large SOEs and central government with personnel in local economies often unaware of and not consulted about decisions taken. Municipal governments made plans without the cooperation of large SOEs in their localities and in turn these SOEs usually ignored those local plans. The privatization process reflected these past relationships, and strong tendencies towards vertical rather than horizontal linkages were evident, with different agendas being pursued by national and local institutions. For example, the regional Ministries of Privatization based in the 'voivodship' were an extension of national government and decisions were likely to reflect national priorities and concerns rather than specific local circumstances. Therefore important decisions about large local SOEs were taken at national level without reference to local actors.
The continued pre-eminence of State Owned Enterprises
Brownfield foreign investments as part of the privatization programme were all negotiated at national level, with local actors playing a role only at workplace level. Firms such as Rokita and Wrozamet were both part of National Investment Funds (Mass Privatization Programme), holding companies with both a national and international element based in Warsaw but with significant ownership lying outside Poland. 7 In the restructuring and sale of Polgas (state monopoly industrial gas company) or Dolmel there was no regional logic or coherence to the bundles of firms assembled for the purchase of foreign investors and no mechanism to ensure that local interests would have any sway or influence. Thus decisions regarding the expansion, closure or rationalization of a large flagship SOE lay in Warsaw rather than the locality or region. A palpable bitterness and frustration was evident from the outcome of a national decision to sell a local computer firm to Siemens in the early 1990s. Siemens had been forced to buy the Wrocław company as part of a national package to gain entry into the telecommunications market. Part of the agreement was that all 1500 employees would be maintained; however, the redundancy package was so attractive that all jobs were voluntarily 'relinquished'.
Competing interests: emerging elites versus the old guard An important element of institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1995) is consensus, trust and a congruity of objectives (Hausner and Marody, 2000) . This could emerge in one of two ways. The logic of the systemic vacuum argument (Jessop, 1995) is that an institutional configuration needs to be constructed with regional development agencies as a principal agent (Hausner et al., 1997) . In the evolutionary analysis with path dependency at its core, institutions would emerge slowly recombining elements of the past and present in a new constellation which will be both fit for purpose and therefore efficient (Grabher and Stark, 1997) . In the case of Wrocław, the lack of coordination and cooperation between various levels of administration and government is the outcome of legacies from the past reflected in current processes of the privatization of land and firms, but also the result of deeper conflict.
Different organizations had evolved to represent different factions of capital. The Lower Silesian Chamber of Commerce was set up in 1989 as a nonprofit-making voluntary organization. It employed four people and had 400 members in 1999, 85 percent of whom were based in the municipality. Despite the nominal membership of large foreign investors, the organization mainly represented the interests and concerns of SMEs. For example, 25 percent of member firms were tourist or holiday firms who cooperated on issues such as standards of service and marketing. Another significant group were the small firms who owned bars, restaurants and cultural institutions such as galleries in the old town, who had collectively made representations to the muncipality on issues such as leases. Thus the activities of the Chamber of Commerce reflected the membership and concerns of SMEs.
In the early 1990s there had been an initiative by the governor of the 'voivodship' to form the Psie Pole Industrial Group to represent and develop the interests of white goods manufacturers, comprising the large SOEs such Polar, Wrozamet, Hydral and Dolmel. It was envisaged that they would cooperate together for mutual support and development, with shared technology and research, suppliers and marketing. Financial backing would be forthcoming from a powerful local bank. However, the individual interests of managers and workers in the firms outweighed the potential benefits of the cooperation. For example, one SOE lost the contract for supplying components to the white goods SOE across the road because it could not meet delivery times and quality standards. The white goods firm went on to source components outside the locality and outside the country.
Foreign capital in the area tended to coalesce around the British Chamber of Commerce. In addition to British firms, US and Swedish firms were also included in the list of members. The Chamber facilitated important informal contacts between foreign investors, who used it as a forum for the exchange of information on wage levels, work practices and infrastructural problems. It was also the starting point for incoming FDI in terms of establishing contacts with existing firms. The municipality was unable to get any large foreign investors interested in contributing to the Wrocław 2000 plan because, as one interviewee suggested, 'They are too busy playing their own games'. The Psie Pole Industrial Group, the Lower Silesian Chamber of Commerce and the British Chamber of Commerce represented the interests of different sections of capital in terms of both size and nationality. These are manifest in these three organizations, exhibiting different and possibly divergent interests and largely operating within different ambits.
The creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) at national level in 1995 gave preferential tax treatment to foreign investors and added to the complexity of regional governance and intensified inter-regional competition. Without any SEZs within its territory there were fears that Wrocław would become relatively unattractive in comparison to those regions that could offer substantial financial inducements such as tax holidays. Two firms which had intially showed a strong interest in the Wrocław region decided to locate in SEZs. Consequently Motorola located near Krakow and General Motors in the Katowice area. More problematic is the fact that two adjacent 'voivodships' of Wałbrzych and Legnica 8 had been designated SEZs and this may have deflected potential investments from Wrocław. Volkswagen, for example, has built a greenfield site to construct engines for its global operations in Polkowice.
In comparison with the municipality the 'voivodship' showed a much greater degree of inertia. The Department of Economic Initiatives set up on 1 July 1990 was nominally responsible for economic development in the 'voivodship'. This department was also the regional representative of the Ministry of Privatization, and therefore economic development was mainly viewed as being synonymous with promoting privatization. Thus there was no strategy or vision for economic development because the main activity was divesting property and selling off large numbers of small and medium-sized companies. In this case the plan had been exchanged for the market with a complete absence of understanding or discussion as to how newly created SMEs might be supported by the 'voivodship' or how entrepreneurial expertise harnessed in wider networks. There was no notion of creating a supportive environment in which these firms might develop -private property was seen as the only necessary condition for successful entrepreneurship.
Path shapers in the locality
This section identifies and elaborates a discussion regarding those groups who have been significant agents of change. First, an examination of the role of the 'nomenklatura' accords with the view that powerful social groups have led to chaotic decision making. Second, there is a focus upon the importance of organized workers, and in particular Solidarity. This trade union cum political party was central in dismantling the old communist system and shifting the trajectory towards a more marketbased economy. At a local level Solidarity has played an important role in either cooperating with or contesting change, particularly at the level of the workplace. The final section examines the role of agents from western market economies and the part they have played in influencing formal institutions and shifting informal institutions.
Social capital into economic capital: the 'nomenklatura'
The main impact of the chaos of the 1980s was that the ruling class and party leaders started to turn their social capital into economic capital. By the end of the 1980s, many managers followed the call of the leadership and engaged in private enterprise, and party and state officials used their position to become wealthy owners of what used to be state enterprises (Kolankiewicz and Lewis, 1988) . Typically, what happened in so-called 'nomenklatura' privatization was that an SOE would sell its non-core operations, such as a computer centre, repair facilities, or the sales centre to a group of insiders that included managers and party members. Purchasers were offered favourable terms in the price, leases or licenses, thus stripping SOEs of their most profitable operations (Kierzkowski et al., 1993) . As enterprises were restricted from raising prices, the private purchaser could buy cheaply and make a profit by selling on the unrestricted black market. These 'nomenklatura' privatizations further weakened the management of the SOEs. Decentralization allowed them the option of shifting their power base, either by acting as owners of small businesses or as a result of 'nomenklatura' privatizations, or more commonly as increasingly powerful managers in quasigovernmental, decentralized enterprises.
As we saw earlier, since 1990 that group of people who constitute the 'nomenklatura' at a local level have actively transformed and reconstituted their social capital to transform themselves from the agents and beneficiaries of the command economy to the new entrepreneurs. The remnants of the 'nomenklatura' do not form a homogenous group and are much more fluid than before 1990, and as we shall see have deeply differentiated interests regarding foreign capital and the restructuring of firms. In these recombinant emerging institutional forms it is envisaged, and indeed viewed as desirable by some, that the new elite of entrepreneurs will substantially overlap with the old 'nomenklatura' (Grabher and Stark, 1997) . Strong connections are seen between managerial and technocratic positions in the state sector and success in entering entrepreneurship in post-communism.
The legacy of the previous period was that the former elite was well placed to convert its cultural capital of education and training acquired in the old order to prominent positions in the new, and this was manifest in three ways. First, this has been reflected in the way that managers of previous SOEs have bypassed local government in their disposal of assets, in particular selling land to foreign food retailers. Second, in the locality there was strong continuity between those who managed the old firms and the new management in FDI-owned firms, particularly in brownfield developments. In some cases this role was nominal, in others an active managerial position; but in both instances foreign investors wanted to buy into social networks. Third, powerful actors in the 'voivodship' have been able to use their position and networks to convert the physical and cultural capital of the old system to assets under the new market economy, from which they are direct beneficiaries. Interviews with a selection of worker-management buyouts in Wrocław confirmed the findings of Tittenbrun (1995) that this process has enabled previous managers or people in key positions to transform themselves into the entrepreneurs, managers and new owners of small and medium-sized enterprises. This trend was evident in extant SMEs or where new firms had been formed as spin-offs from large SOEs. It is important to note that leading members of Solidarity were also able to turn social capital into political and economic capital, not only through positions in newly emerging political structures, but also as owners of SMEs or middle managers in larger firms. In this locality there was clearly suspicion and conflict between Solidarity-based networks and those involving the pre-1990 'nomenklatura'.
Blockade capital into social capital: workers
Rather than seeing firms as consensual and coherent, workplaces are regarded as sites of (potential) conflict (Clarke et al., 1993; Thirkell et al., 1994; Herod, 1998) . It follows that this analysis brings the role of both organized and unorganized labour into focus as a significant agent of change, as cooperators with, initiators, or contestors of transformation, with regard to the privatization process and the restructuring of firms. At a national level, government strategy was either At enterprise level, attempts to reform structures of property ownership and the relations of production were constrained and conditioned by the traditional approaches of managers and workers developed over the long period of the command economy. The need to restructure the labour process and to introduce capitalist patterns of labour control have been viewed as a necessary corollary in the attempt to transform the economy into a large privately owned market system. However, the difficulty in doing this is what makes labour relations a key issue for regime change (Thirkell et al., 1994: 1) .
After the political and economic crisis of 1981 workers' self-management 9 was conceded as part of the measures giving SOEs more autonomy. This remained on the statute book and was strengthened by the Employee Self Government Law of 1989. Under the terms of the self-management legislation, the general meeting of employees elected members of the Workers Council, and the director and all high and medium-level managerial staff were excluded from running the Council. The Council had broad powers which included: drawing up the annual plan, auditing the annual balance sheet, making resolutions concerning investment, approving cooperation or partnership arrangements with other economic entities, and approving the acquisition of fixed assets.
Although Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych (OPZZ), the All Polish Trade Union Federation, was the official trade union of the communist regime created in 1984, it was Solidarity (legalized in 1989) that was the powerful political force which mobilized large numbers of workers to bring about the demise of the Communist Government. As a political party Solidarity ushered in the period of market-led transformation (Rainnie and Hardy, 1995) initiated by the 'shock therapy' reforms of 1990. It was a Janus-like organization, described by Lewis (1994) in 1990 as being a political giant but a trade-union pygmy. Solidarity, instead of constituting, 'blockade capital', transformed into 'social capital' to facilitate reforms involving massive restrictions on consumption and far-reaching structural change (Deppe and Tatur, 1997) . At the level of the Wrocław regional economy, Solidarity's enthusiasm for the market, in theory at least, manifested itself in courses organized by Solidarity on market economics attended by 100 of its members, and financed by the (American) University of New Britain. In practice the role of Solidarity has been more complicated and at times contradictory, both competing with and contesting the pace, scale and form of restructuring.
However, although Solidarity embraced the notion of the market with a degree of enthusiasm, there was a gap between the rhetoric of the market (and the expectations it engendered) and the realities which members experienced in their workplaces. This gave rise to instances of conflict over the role of FDI in the emerging ownership structures and its impact on the firm, which were both strongly contested. In two of the largest SOEs in the region Solidarity was able to significantly influence the process of restructuring. In the Polar white goods factory the privatization process was slow and contested at every stage. Between 1989 and 1996 Solidarity and the Workers Council were a major force in shaping and negotiating the restructuring process. They represented an enduring presence and degree of stability while in the same time period there were seven managing directors who were dismissed by the Workers Council. They were successful (up to 2000 at least) in defending a range of social provision, preventing redundancies and securing a significant percentage of shares to finance the social fund. In the case of Jelcz, the Polish truck and bus producer, the determination of Solidarity to maintain employment levels meant that Volvo discontinued a joint venture in which they had been involved. Solidarity exhibited a strong preference for Polish capital, and Jelcz was sold to a firm who purported to be committed to a high level of social provision and had a large degree of Polish ownership.
In its function as a trade union, apart from the key role played in a number of flagship SOEs, Solidarity has played a defensive role with little involvement in any vision of economic development in the locality. It has mostly been concerned with trying to mitigate the effects of the impact of rapid transformation on the most vulnerable sections of the community. In the 'voivodship' there was one main office in Wrocław municipality and 10 smaller offices in other towns. Within the 'voivodship' Solidarity dealt with diverse problems and the differential effects of transformation as some subregions faced very high levels of unemployment. The shedding of jobs in its traditional base of SOEs and a failure to recruit and establish a presence in the new foreign investments -particularly, the retail sector -has left Solidarity operating on the margins.
The reduced importance of trade unions at the local level is reflected in their declining influence and membership at a national level, with tradeunion density falling from 80 percent of the workforce in the mid-1980s to 14 percent in 2002 (www.eiro.eurfound, 2002) . Currently there are estimated to be between 3m and 3.5m trade-union members; Solidarity has an estimated membership of 1.2m and OPZZ more or less the same. By the late 1990s both of these two unions had launched campaigns to try and reverse some of the decline and had had success with gaining branches in major foreign investments, and in particular establishing their organizations in the growing number of foreign-owned supermarkets.
Imported intellectual capital: western market economies
Governments, firms and NGOs from western market economies have been important agents of change in attempting to institute a new set of informal institutions at both a national and a local level. In the communist period the locality had accumulated knowledge comprising embedded habits, routines and legacies, which western economists and business practitioners have generally considered to be unsuitable legacies and a barrier to economic development. According to Pejovich (1994) this philosophical heritage was based on communalism, political hierarchy, shared values and shared traditions. These collective norms and values were not viewed as conducive to methodological individualism and rewards based on performance. Notions of collectivism were reflected in a deeply entrenched belief in the communal provision of a variety of benefits such as low-cost vacations, allowances for children, medical benefits, subsidized housing and leisure.
The market economies of the West have been proactive in transferring what was thought to be 'appropriate knowledge' relating to the functioning of market economies. Managerial know-how has been transferred through FDI, which was transmitted through the extensive training given to senior and middle managers, coupled with the transfer of management systems from the home country. Managers of foreign investments in the region consciously attempted to displace 'old attitudes' to work and replace them with those which were in line with US and West European work practices (Hardy, 2002) .
After the establishment of a critical mass of foreign capital there was a growth in the number and activities of organizations, both formal and informal, to fulfil a networking function and to lobby in the interests of foreign capital. Volvo's corporate strategy of having expatriates in post for a longer period than other firms led the Managing Director to lobby for an international school in order to recruit and maintain younger executives with families in post. The international school opened in Wrocław in September 1998 and the Managing Director of Volvo was appointed to the supervisory board. In addition, by 1999 there were British, German and Swedish consuls. Further, the Swedish consul appointed in 1998 was the Polish HRM Director at Volvo. Representatives of foreign capital have lobbied for infrastructural improvements and facilities such as international banks and direct flights from a larger number of European destinations. All these developments have served to lock the region further into international circuits of capital and increase its attractiveness from the point of view of potential investors.
Creating the appropriate institutional conditions has been at the heart of assistance and aid from western market economies. Knowledge has also been transferred through aid to transforming economies predicated on the idea that change will be facilitated and accelerated through an understanding of the 'right' ideas or the existence of best practice (often unadapted), strictly codified, bundled and transferred. The New Britain University from America gave a special grant to the Technical University of Wrocław, one element of which was to organize courses for trade unionists on economics. The syllabus, based on a neoliberal economics text, was designed to help workers understand the 'new situation' and the meaning of a market economy and the current problems faced by enterprises. Further, Trade Union leaders from Jelcz and Polar were provided with all-expensespaid trips to the US, which lasted several weeks, on the invitation of American trade unions. These were overt attempts to transfer, unmodified, a set of myths about the free market whose economic benefits were viewed as unassailable.
Although there were attempts to shift the mindsets of existing trade unions, they were generally seen as an impediment to change. In newly privatized firms the position of trade unions was severely weakened by the abolition of Workers Councils. In the case of greenfield foreign investment the strategies deployed by firms varied. In the case of Volvo a small branch of Solidarity had been established, while in other workplaces (and particularly the retail sector) trade union membership had been actively resisted by employers.
There were more subtle attempts at introducing new ways of thinking from Western European economies that fell short of the all-embracing ideological packages exported from the US. For example, Ostwestcentrum was a non-governmental organization financed by local government from Bayern, Germany with the aim of transferring knowledge and imparting business practices. The organization worked with the Lower Silesian Chamber of Commerce to provide support for local SMEs through organizing short courses on making business plans and business games.
Otrek was a Polish consultancy which was supported as part of the UK Know-how initiative, 10 and this aid took the form of buying-in assistance from the UK's leading supplier of training. Initially these UK consultants advised the company on how to transform itself from a cooperative with many stakeholders to a two-person limited liability company. Simultaneously they transferred packages for training in a wide variety of management skills in human resources management, finance and marketing, which were transferred with varying degrees of customization for the local market. Between 1996 and 1998 a number of consultants from the UK had delivered courses, on the basis of disseminating what was understood to be 'best management practices' to Polish trainers and managers.
Therefore there was extensive investment in the necessary ideological apparatus at a local level to displace old attitudes, mindsets and routines and replace them with those more adapted to the needs of market economies and underpinned by unquestionable assumptions regarding the desirability and efficacy of market-led transformation.
Conclusion
By the end of 1999 the formal institutions of governance in Wrocław were embryonic and fractured. No coherent strategy was evident and institutions at different spatial levels such as the 'voivodship', the municipality and sub-regions were pursuing their own agendas regarding both attracting inward investment and wider issues of development. Alongside the newly emerging interests of indigenous SMEs and foreign TNCs, powerful local networks carried over from the previous regime continued to exert influence in the locality through SOEs and the 'voivodship'.
From 1990 onwards the reduced importance of SOEs had a profound effect on local governance that extended beyond the economic effects of job reduction or reduced social provision. These institutions were important and powerful actors under the previous regime, and their decline has had a marked effect both in terms of power relations and their role in shifting collective understanding. The specific industrial legacies of the Wrocław region have produced a different configuration of interests. The relatively diverse economic base has meant fewer obstacles to restructuring, particularly as foreign investment has absorbed some of the local managerial elite into the transnational capitalist class.
At the level of the workplace, Solidarity accepted the rhetoric of the market but not its material consequences in terms of employment reduction, changing habits of work and different systems of organizational governance. Finally, in the context of weak and underdeveloped structures of local governance, western institutions in the form of governments (national, local and supranational) and TNCs have been able to have a significant impact on institution building. Foreign investors have created their own institutions including chambers of commerce, international schools and consuls. Aid programmes from the US or Western Europe have been deliberately focused on shifting collective understandings in the locality, ranging from advice on reconstructing governance to crude attempts to instil an understanding of the market.
The institutional approach provides good tools for unpacking the complexities of regional change, that go beyond simple causal relationships correlating appropriate local formal institutions and local economic development. Change is seen as path-dependent, where actors are the product of inherited economic and social relations. Governance is understood as encompassing a much broader set of social relations than those implied by approaches focusing simply on local and regional government. Informal institutions of values, routines and habits are viewed as central to understanding and informing the agendas of economic agents and understanding unintended outcomes of economic processes. Exogenous influences in the form of aid, cooperation and foreign investment have become endogenized, and have moulded understanding at the levels of both the locality and the workplace.
A study of the Wrocław municipality is a microcosm of the tensions, conflict and competing claims in a locality. It sheds some light on the complexities that are being faced in the (re)building governance in the new regional structure of Dolnośląskie established in 1999, which encompasses sub-regions with very different industrial, social and political legacies, overlaid with a multiplicity of interventions from the EU and national government. The key question is how far these arrangements provide a more successful recipe for coherent regional development, or whether they merely represent a new arena in which entrenched and competing interests will play out their agendas.
Notes
1 See the following for taxonomies of institutionalist thought: Mayhew (1988) ; Samuels (1995) ; Hall and Taylor (1996) ; DiMaggio (1998); Hodgson (2001); Nielsen (2001) . 2 This was translated at a policy level into the Balcerowicz programme (January 1990), which comprised a dose of draconian deflationary IMF policies and rapid liberalization aimed at creating the conditions for the emergence of competitive markets (Blanchard et al., 1991) . Shock therapy was justified on the grounds that the cure for the disease of the economic sclerosis of the previous regime required drastic and painful surgery (Kornai, 1990a; 1990b; Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Brada, 1993; Lloyd, 1996) . Lipton and Sachs (1990) wrote the seminal article summarizing the neoliberal position, which argued that the goal of reforms was to produce an economic system comparable to those in Western Europe. 3 Some schools of thought would see evolutionary thinking as a subset of institutionalist thinking. Indeed, one of Veblen's major contributions was to produce an essay in 1898 on 'Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science'. As Hodgson (1998) points out, evolutionary economics is a vague and ill-defined term, which does not necessarily imply drawing directly on biology. Evolutionary theory, however, in this article, should be understood as those theorists who lean more heavily on the use of biological metaphors. 4 The old institutionalism belongs to that social-science tradition based on a strategy of seeing people as a product of culture, whereas the new institutionalism (Williamson, 1975; North, 1990 ) favours a view of people as 'rational choosers' (Mayhew, 1988 Wałbrzych, Legnica and Jelenia Góra. Therefore competition is now intra-rather than inter-regional. 9 The notion of workers' self-management is strongly rooted in the Polish radical trade union tradition (Biezenski, 1994) . The spontaneous seizure of the factories by militants in 1945 resulted in the formation of factory councils (Kennedy, 1997) , and in 1956 (Harman, 1988) and in 1970 workers turned to self-management in the form of Workers Councils or commissions. Pankow (1993) argues that Polish SOEs in the postwar period were scenes of permanent social conflict, sometimes hidden sometimes overt. Workers tried, with varying degrees of consistency and success, to build workers' representation in factories which communist employers tried to counter. 10 The UK Know-how Fund was aid given specifically to Poland, aimed at transferring business skills, retraining redundant workers or supporting regional labour market planning. In many cases UK consultants were the financial beneficiaries of such initiatives.
